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5. Forgiveness as New Creation:
Christ and the Moral Life Revisited
Lois Malcolm

Introduction
As Hannah Arendt has observed, forgiveness is Christianity’s unique
contribution to the Western world.1 The Greeks did not have a concept
of forgiveness, and although it may have had a role in Roman law, it
was for the most part not a major category of human action in the an
cient world. Jesus of Nazareth brought forgiveness to the forefront. Not
only did he create controversy by forgiving other people’s sins — taking
on the power that God alone had to forgive sins2 — but he also enjoined
his followers to forgive one another, and even made God’s forgiveness
of them contingent on their forgiving others.3 The Lord’s Prayer en
joins God to forgive us as we forgive our debtors.4 5At the Last Supper,
Jesus invites his followers to eat bread, “my body,” and drink wine, “my
blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgive
ness of sins.”3 After his resurrection, Jesus grants his disciples the Holy
Spirit who will enable them to forgive and retain sins.6 After his ascen
1. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998), PP- 236-43.
2. See Luke 5:21-24; cf. Matthew 9:4-6 and Mark 2:7-10. See also Arendt, The Human
Condition, p. 239.
3. See Matthew 6:14-15; see also 18:35 and Mark 11:25. See also Arendt, The Human
Condition, p. 239.
4. See Matthew 6:9b-i3; cf. Mark 11:25; Luke 11:2-4.
5. Matthew 26:26-28.
6. John 20:22-23; see also Luke 24:44-49.
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sion, Jesus sends the Holy Spirit who propels the disciples with a mes
sage — from Judea to Samaria to the ends of the earth — that calls peo
ple to repent and be baptized so their sins may be forgiven and they too
may receive the Holy Spirit.7
While forgiveness has been at the heart of Christian faith and
practice over the centuries, it is interesting to note that it has also be
come a central theme in contemporary scholarly and popular litera
ture. Given the reality of conflict throughout the world, forgiveness
and reconciliation are increasingly becoming topics of interest in
philosophy8 and politics.9 Moreover, forgiveness is also becoming a ma
jor theme in psychological literature and its self-help variants, litera
ture that attends to its import not only for interpersonal relationships
at home or at work but also for one’s individual growth and sanity.10
In this paper, I examine the relationship between Christ and ethics
by arguing, from a reading of Paul’s Christology, that Christian forgive
ness cannot be divorced from the new age the crucified and raised
Christ has ushered in, a “new creation” that Christians believe we have a
foretaste of even on this side of the eschaton.11 In my interpretation of
7. See Acts 1:8 and 2:38, where the response to Christian proclamation includes re
pentance, baptism, forgiveness of sins, and reception of the Holy Spirit (see also 8:16;
10:44-48; 19:1-6).
8. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark
Dooley and Michael Hughes (New York: Routledge, 2001), and Charles L. Griswold, For
giveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
9. See, e.g., Peter Digeser, Political Forgiveness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2001), and Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide
and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).
10. For psychological work on forgiveness, see Robert D. Enright and Richard
P. Fitzgibbons, Helping Clients Forgive: An Empirical Guide for Resolving Anger and Restoring
Elope (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000); Robert D. Enright,
Forgiveness Is a Choice: A Step-by-Step Process for Resolving Anger and Restoring Hope (Wash
ington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001); Michael E. McCullough, Ken
neth I. Pargament, and Carl E. Tlioresen, eds., Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice
(New York: Guilford Press, 2001); and Everett L. Worthington, Dimensions of Forgiveness:
Psychological Research and Theological Perspectives, Laws of Life Symposia Series, vol. 1 (West
Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2000), Forgiveness and Reconciliation:
Theory and Application (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2006), and Handbook of Forgiveness
(New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2005).
11. See Galatians 5:6; 6:15. Paul’s use of “new creation” echoes Isaiah 65:17-25. Paul
understands salvation as God’s re-creation of the world (see Rom. 8:19-23; 2 Cor. 5:17-19;
see also Rev. 21:5). For an earlier treatment of this relationship, see Jurgen Moltmann,
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this Christology, I also draw on two secular appropriations of Christian
notions of forgiveness that have creativity at the heart of their under
standing of forgiveness.*
121 develop this argument in four sections. First,
I locate my argument in relation to contemporary debates in Christian
ethics and in political thought. Second, I examine two major secular ap
propriations of Christian understandings of forgiveness — as a form of
psychological creativity (in Julia Kristeva)13 and as a form of political
creativity (in Hannah Arendt).14 Third, I examine Paul Ricoeur’s com
plex and detailed account of the “Adamic myth” in Paul’s theology, an
account that explicitly demonstrates by way of close readings of biblical
traditions how the forgiveness and justification identified with Jesus’
death and resurrection cannot be divorced from an eschatological con
text.15 Finally, I discuss the ethical implications of the profound link
within Christian faith between forgiveness of sins and new creation.

A Context for My Argument
I situate my argument by way of a contrast with two conceptions of
Christian ethics. Several decades ago, in a book called Christ and the
Moral Life, James Gustafson analyzed different ways theologians have
related Christology to ethics. In that book, he developed a typology
“Justification and New Creation,” The Future of Creation: Collected Essays (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1979), pp. 149-71.
12. For an account compatible with my argument, see F. LeRon Shults and Ste
ven J. Sandage, The Faces ofForgiveness: Searcbingfor Wholeness and Salvation (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2003). For an influential theological critique of the psychological use
of forgiveness, see L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995).
13. See Julia Kristeva’s essays on “Can Forgiveness Heal?” and “The Scandal of the
Timeless,” in Intimate Revolt: The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis, trans. Jeanine
Herman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 14-24, 25-42. See also
“Dostoyevsky, the Writing of Suffering, and Forgiveness,” in Black Sun: Depression and
Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 173218. For other relevant works by Kristeva, see Hannah Arendt, trans. Ross Guberman
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); New Maladies of the Soul, trans. Ross
Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Powers of Horror: An Essay
on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
14. See Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 236-47.
15. See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967).
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based on three central ethical concerns: the sources of the moral good,
the self’s agency, and criteria for moral judgment and action.16
Christologies that depict Christ as “creator and redeemer” focus on
how Christ is the source of the good in Christian ethics. Those that fo
cus on Christ as “justifier” and “sanctifier” focus on how Christ is the
source of the self’s moral agency. Those that focus on Christ as “pat
tern” and “teacher” focus on how Christ is the criterion of judgment
and action in the Christian life.
In this essay, I take one of these themes, “Christ as justifier,” as
the answer to the three main questions, but in doing so I argue for a
somewhat different construal of “Christ as justifier” than the one
Gustafson outlined. Drawing primarily on Martin Luther and
Reinhold Niebuhr, Gustafson defines justification as freedom. De
fined negatively, this freedom is a freedom from legalism. Defined pos
itively, this freedom enables one to love the neighbor, to be open to the
present and the future, and to be realistic and pragmatic.17 I agree that
justification entails these things; nonetheless, I stress something
Gustafson does not. Following the apostle Paul, I argue that justifica
tion cannot be divorced from the new eschatological age he identifies
with Christ’s cross and resurrection. This new age, or new creation, has
an embodied and corporate character that includes not only Christ’s
work as justifier and sanctifier, but also enacts Christ’s creative and re
demptive power and provides, albeit in a fashion that continually seeks
to discern what is most fitting in each situation, a concrete criterion
for judgment and action — Christ’s cross and resurrection.
I make this case in response to a recent trend in Christian ethics
in North America, a trend exemplified in the work of Stanley
Hauerwas, which stresses the distinctive character of the biblical narra
tive and the centrality of the Christian community especially in shap
ing the virtues required of the Christian life.18 Although I have no dis
agreement with any of these emphases — they clearly are central
components of any thoroughgoing conception of Christian ethics and
16. James Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper & Itow, 1963).
17. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life, chap. 3.
18. See, e.g., the following by Stanley Hauerwas: The Peaceable Kingdom (London:
SCM Press, 2003); A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); and After Christendom (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1991). See also Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident
Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989).
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offer an important corrective to the more abstract and formal concep
tion of “justification” presented in Gustafson’s book — I nonetheless
argue that they are incomplete. Paul’s eschatology, with its focus on
God’s creative righteousness, is not simply about the distinctive narra
tives and virtues of particular Christian communities, although it en
compasses them. It is about the universal activity of the “one” that
later Christian theology would affirm is a triune God.19 Although
deeply embodied within human communities, this activity justifies
and sanctifies by creating a “righteousness” (Rom. 3:21-26) that is radi
cally distinct from any law or communitarian grammar that sustains
particular groups of people — whether they be, in Paul’s words, “Jew or
Greek,” “slave or free,” or “male and female” (Gal. 3:2s).20
The second context in which I would like to situate my argument
is a broader discussion about the role of religion in public life. For this,
I turn to Mark Lilia’s historical analysis in The Stillborn God of the polit
ical and theological ideas that have shaped our understanding of the
role of religion in public life within Western thought.21 With the Thirty
Years’ War after the Reformation (1618-1648), a particular political argu
ment emerged, in particular with Thomas Hobbes but also with David
Hume and John Locke, that called for a “Great Separation” between re
ligion and politics. Another strand of thought, exemplified by Imman
uel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, argued for a liberal conception of theology
that could serve as the ethical substance for public life. In Lilia’s view,
this liberal faith — with its “stillborn God” — was so desiccated of reli
gious passion that it created a vacuum after the First World War. Messi
anic theologies in Judaism and Christianity emerged to fill this vac
uum — theologies that, at their best, were suspicious of modern
democracies and, at their worst, were tolerant of some of the worst ex
cesses of either Nazi socialism or communism.
In response to Lilia’s concerns about messianic theology, I hope
to make the case that Paul’s conception of it, like that of the Gospels, is
not of a political theology for governing the state. The crucified Mes
siah Christians worship was a failed political leader. The power of the
19. “God is one” (Gal. 3:20; Rom. 3:30), an allusion to Deuteronomy 6:4.
20. See also Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Uniuersalism, trans. Ray
Brassier (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), and Gunther Bornkamm, Patti
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
21. Mark Lilia, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York:
Vintage, 2008).
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new age he ushers in is the power of the Suffering Servant, whose weak
ness and death are the source of power and life for others. Any Chris
tian uses of messianic theology that fail to meet the criterion of the
cross are false. Although I will need to develop the case more fully else
where, I do hope, at least in a small way, to intimate some sense of how
Christian ideas of forgiveness and justification might be relevant to
public life even though — or precisely because — they do not involve the
coercive use of political force.

Two Secular Accounts of Forgiveness and Creativity
Kristeva on Forgiveness and Agency

In order to understand better the relationship between forgiveness and
creativity, I turn first to Julia Kristeva’s work. A linguist and a psychoana
lyst, Kristeva has throughout her work sought to understand how speak
ing subjects are always creating new meanings within old psychic and lin
guistic patterns, meanings that enact the “semiotic” (unconscious drives
within us) by the “symbolic” (the structures and patterns of language,
culture, and art we use to express ourselves). Her work on forgiveness,
which explicitly draws on Christian themes, exemplifies this process.
Drawing on Ricoeur’s Symbolism ofEvil, Kristeva gleans three cen
tral themes in Christian conceptions of forgiveness for her work as a
psychoanalyst, themes I will explore in more depth in my discussion of
Ricoeur’s work.22 First, Christianity has a complex understanding of
fault that encompasses not only a movement from communal sin to in
dividual guilt but also retains more archaic conceptions of defilement by
an external contagion from which one must be purified. Second, Chris
tianity presupposes that Christ, as the innocent “Suffering Servant,”
undergoes an “absurd” and “scandalous” suffering. Not a punishment
(as effect) for his sin (as cause), this suffering is, rather, a voluntary suf
fering (a gift) that becomes, by way of the transfer of others’ sin onto
him, a means by which these others receive pardon and healing.
Third, Christianity affirms that the “justification” or forgiveness
22. See Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, especially the essays “Can Forgiveness Heal?” pp.
14-25 and “The Scandal of the Timeless,” pp. 25-42. Page numbers given parenthetically
in this section will refer to this text.
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this pardon and healing enact actually has efficacious power to bring
about not only remission of sins but also rebirth or new life. Christ’s for
giveness enacts a new subjective and intersubjective configuration
whereby “guilt is extracted from judgment and time in order to be re
versed in rebirth” (p. 16). In other words, Christ enters human misery not
merely to receive its punishment or share in its pain, but rather also to
“reverse” it by way of an “efficacy” that creates “meaning” where there is
“lack.” By faith, the Christian biblical and theological tradition inter
prets the apparently “scandalous” death of the innocent Jesus of Naza
reth in terms of the bond of love between Father, Son, and Spirit. Within
this bond of love, not only are human guilt and its time ofjudgment and
punishment suspended, but something new is created and effected.
Interpretation is the concept Kristeva uses to relate a Christian un
derstanding of forgiveness to what happens in psychoanalysis. Psycho
analysis also works with guilt and love. It seeks to reinterpret guilt —
which, within a psychoanalytic framework, is defined as the ill-being
linked with anxiety, trauma, depression, and more generally, a sense of
lack — in relation to the bond of love enacted in the “transference” be
tween the psychoanalyst and the analysand. By reinterpreting the guilt of
ill-being, psychoanalysis seeks to undo the psychological apparatus that
generated it. This interpretation enacts a secular forgiveness that accepts
the semiotic drives that emerge out of the unconscious even as it seeks to
sublimate those drives into new, healthier “symbolic” expressions. For
giveness occurs within the transfer of love — the transference and
counter-transference that occur between the psychoanalyst and analy
sand — a love that enables preverbal instincts and affects to be brought
out into the open so that they can be given meaning. Such interpretation
does not absolve the savage desires of the unconscious — for example, its
desire to either reject or “abject” the self or murder others.23 Rather, it
seeks a “third way between dejection and murder.” In psychoanalysis, we
experience the forgiveness that enables us to confess our desire to kill in
stead of killing. Within the context of the relationship with the analyst,
the analysand experiences an unconditional acceptance that enables her
to “make sense” of “troubling senselessness.”24
23. See Kristeva’s treatment of “abjection” in Powers ofHorror: An Essay on Abjection.
24. See also Kelly Oliver’s discussion of Kristeva in The Colonization ofPsychic Space:
A Psychoanalytic Theory of Oppression (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004),
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The communication between the analyst and the analysand is not
merely verbal or intellectual. It takes place in a transfer of affects and
instincts that are given meaning in the process of communication. The
way analytic interpretation gives meaning through this transfer of af
fects is a form of pardon (par meaning “through”; don meaning “gift”)
that “has nothing to do with ‘explication’ and ‘communication’ be
tween two consciousnesses. On the contrary, this par-don draws its ef
ficacy from reuniting with affect through metaphorical and metonym
ical rifts in discourse” (p. 26). Forgiveness supports the transfer of
affects and drives — the unconscious — into signification. It happens
between two communicating bodies, what psychoanalysts call the
“third.” Agency in the forgiving process lies in this “third”; it lies nei
ther solely in the analyst nor solely in the analysand. It is an effect of
meaning experienced between two people. In this transfer, the mean
inglessness of life, especially the meaninglessness of trauma, is “for
given” by being given signification or meaning. It is, in Kristeva’s
words, the “coming of the unconscious to consciousness in transfer
ence” (p. 19). The suspension of judgment required for forgiveness —
the suspension of the harsh, judging superego — facilitates the “subli
mation” of the semiotic drive of the unconscious into language.
The pardon that enables this sublimation occurs within what
Kristeva calls a “luminous phase” of “conscious atemporality,” a
“strange atemporal space” that reconfigures the cause-and-effect rela
tionship of crime and punishment (pp. 25-42). Not the “strange space”
of the savage, desiring unconscious, this “strange space” is a space that
welcomes and accepts the savage unconscious so that it can give it
meaning and thereby transform and heal it. In a fashion similar to the
way in which the unconscious stops time in our lives by continually re
peating patterns that enact desire and death — patterns deeply
engrained in our bodies — so pardon stops time, but now in a way that
seeks to reconstruct through love a new way of being with one’s self
and others (pp. 29-31).
Because this pardon is essentially about interpretation, it creates
new forms. It has the effect of an action — a deed or a. poiesis (new cre
ation) — that expresses what “humiliated and offended individuals”
have experienced in their “bruised emotions and bodies” (p. 20). This
new form integrates sense and nonsense in a fashion, like Hegel’s
Aufhebung, that arises as “a positive jolt integrating a possible nothing
ness” (p. 20). By bearing the erosion of meaning, what Kristeva calls
106
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“abjection,” pardon displaces the erosion of meaning even as it affirms
and inscribes new meaning. When the analyst affirms “there is mean
ing,” which for Kristeva is the “eminently transferential gesture,” she
helps create a “third” that exists for and through another (p. 20). In
sum, forgiveness, and the “remission” it offers, results in “new birth”
(pp. 19-20).

Arendt on Forgiveness and Action

Unlike Kristeva, Hannah Arendt has never put much stock in psycho
analysis. Nonetheless, her work on forgiveness has informed Kristeva’s
work and serves as an interesting point of comparison.25 Arendt appro
priates Christian forgiveness within the context of her understanding
of what is distinctly human about “human action,” what is distinctly
creative and free about human action and not merely a response to pre
determined patterns of cause and effect. In this regard, both Kristeva
and Arendt link forgiveness with the creation of new “meaning.”
Kristeva links this creativity with psychological health and inferiority;
Arendt links it to public action and speech. For both, love sustains the
possibility of a forgiveness that gives expression to new forms of life.
Arendt identifies two activities that explicitly enact such “human
action”: forgiving and promising.26 Both activities directly break and
move beyond cause-and-effect patterns. Forgiving enables us to deal
with irreversibility, that is, the inevitable consequences of past actions.
Promising enables us to deal with unpredictability, that is, the fact that
we cannot foresee what will occur in the future. Further, both forgiving
and promising take place within a context that is very different from a
Platonic grounding for ethics, what justifies and limits our exercise of
power in relation to others. Platonic ethics, Arendt observes, revolves
around one’s own individual capacity for self-control; it relates politi
cal action, and our relation to others in general, to the soul’s right or
dering of itself. By contrast, an ethics that involves forgiving and prom
ising presupposes the presence of others and the synergy that takes
25. See Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, trans. Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003).
26. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. Page numbers given parenthetically
in this section will refer to this text.
107

Lois Malcolm

place between oneself and others. It is intrinsically social, locating indi
vidual action within the context of pre-existing relationships.
If Kristeva draws on a Pauline conception of Christian justifica
tion, then Arendt explicitly draws on the teachings of Jesus. What she
finds most helpful in Jesus’ conception of forgiveness is that he links
forgiveness to the creation of something new and not simply to pen
ance, guilt, and the like. She makes this point drawing on three words
in Luke 17:3-4,27 words found throughout the New Testament. “For
give” (aphienai) has to do with dismissing and releasing; “repent”
(metanoein) has to do with changing one’s mind, rendering the Hebrew
shitv as return, tracing back one’s steps; and finally, “sin” (bamartanein)
has to do with trespass, missing the mark, failing, going away. Arendt
also points out that Jesus arrogates the power of forgiveness to himself
— the power to create anew, to bring about a new state of affairs. This
threatens the “scribes and Pharisees” because Jesus arrogates to him
self what only God has the power to do — forgive sins.28
Moreover, she notes, Jesus tells his disciples to forgive others in
the same way because “if you forgive others their trespasses, your heav
enly Father will also forgive you; but if you do not forgive others, nei
ther will your Father forgive your trespasses” (Matt. 6:14-15). Further
still, she observes that Jesus tells his disciples to forgive others uncon
ditionally, regardless of the extremity of the crime. One is to forgive
“seventy times seven” (Matt. 18:22; cf. Luke 17:4), even though Jesus also
acknowledges the inevitability and seriousness of what Kant called
“radical evil,” unforgivable “offenses” or “occasions for stumbling”
(skandalon): “woe to anyone by whom they come! It would be better for
you if a millstone was hung around your neck and you were thrown
into the sea” (Luke 17:1-4).
Why, in Arendt’s view, is such forgiveness so important to human
action? Because trespassing is an everyday occurrence and we continu
ally need forgiveness — the persistent “mutual release” from what we
have done — to enable us to continue. As fresh release, forgiveness is the
exact opposite of vengeance, our natural and automatic response to
transgression. Vengeance involves both the agent and the sufferer of a
27. “Be on your guard! If another disciple sins, you must rebuke the offender, and
if there is repentance, you must forgive. And if the same person sins against you seven
times a day, and turns back to you seven times and says, 7 repent,’ you must forgive” (Luke
17:3-4, emphasis added).
28. See Luke 5:21-24; cf. Matthew 9:4-6 and Mark 2:7-10; and Luke 7:49.
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misdeed in a “relentless automatism,” an irreversibility that perpetu
ates a chain reaction that, far from putting to an end the consequences
of the first misdeed, keeps everyone bound to a process of chain reac
tions that are both calculated and expected. By contrast, forgiving is an
action that does not “merely re-act” but “acts anew and unexpectedly,
unconditioned by the act which provokes it and therefore freeing from
its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is for
given” (p. 241).
In addition, forgiveness and punishment both differ from ven
geance in that they “put an end to something that without interference
could go on endlessly” (p. 241). Still, they stand in a structural relation
to each other since we are “unable” to “forgive” what we cannot “pun
ish” and we are “unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgiv
able” (p. 241). In this context, Arendt comments on how “radical evil” is
something we as human beings can neither forgive nor punish pre
cisely because it dispossesses us of all power. Those who commit such
crimes deserve to be cast into the sea, as Jesus said, with a “millstone”
around their necks (p. 241). Only the Last Judgment can take care of
such crimes, which, as Arendt notes, the New Testament defines not
only in terms of forgiveness but also in terms of just retribution.29
Forgiveness is always an “eminently personal” affair. The sin, what
was done, is forgiven for the sake of the sinner, the person who did it.
Only love can forgive because only love fully accepts who one is. In the
story of the sinful woman whom Jesus forgives, Jesus states, “her sins,
which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love.
But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little” (Luke 7:47). Love
possesses a clarity of vision that discloses who a person is and could be,
and overlooks ivhat she has been or done in the past (his or her quali
ties, shortcomings, achievements, failings, and transgressions). None
theless, such love appears to be “unworldly” and in fact “impossible” —
indeed “not only apolitical but anti-political” (p. 242). Thus, drawing
on Aristotle’s conception of political friendship, Arendt suggests that
“respect,” a friendship without intimacy and closeness, plays a role in
the political sphere similar to the role “love” plays in the interpersonal
sphere. Operating from a standpoint not of intimacy but of distance,
29. See Matthew 16:27: “For the Son of Man is to come with his angels in the glory
of his Father, and then he will repay everyone for what he has done.” See also 5:17-20;
7:15-20. See also Romans 2:6; 1 Corinthians 4:5; 2 Corinthians 5:10.
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respect enables us to have esteem for others simply because they are hu
man beings and not because of their achievements or qualities (p. 243).
Finally, Arendt connects forgiving and promising with “natality,”
new life. Both activities, which arise directly out of our acting and
speaking with one another, function like “control mechanisms” that
enable us “to start new and unending processes” (p. 246). Without the
capacity “to undo what we have done and to control at least partially
the processes we have let loose,” we would be the victims of “automatic
necessity,” of “inexorable” natural laws. The “law of mortality” may be
the most certain and the only reliable law of lives spent between birth
and death. Nonetheless, there is another law that interferes with this
law — our “faculty of action,” with its ever-present reminder that even
though human beings must die, they are not born “in order to die but
in order to begin” (p. 246, my emphasis).
From the standpoint of automatic processes, of natural causeand-effect relations, this capacity to create something new appears to
be a “miracle,” albeit an “infinite improbability which occurs regularly”
(p. 246). In this regard, Arendt compares the originality ofJesus’ teach
ing on forgiveness to Socrates’ insights into the possibilities of
thought. When Jesus related the power to forgive to the power of per
forming miracles, he put both forgiveness and miracles on the same
level and within the reach of human beings (p. 247). The same faith en
ables us both to forgive and to move mountains. The one is no less a
miracle than the other. Thus, the disciples can only say in response to
Jesus’ command to forgive seventy times seven: “Lord, increase our
faith” (p. 247). For Arendt, the miracle that can save the world of hu
man affairs from its normal, “natural” ruin is the “fact of natality.”
New human beings, and with them new actions and new beginnings,
are continually born. This faculty of birth — of action that continually
creates anew — is what bestows “faith” and “hope,” two virtues absent
in Greek antiquity, on human affairs. The most succinct expression of
this faith and hope is the gospel’s announcement of “glad tidings”: “A
child has been born unto us” (p. 247).

Justification and New Creation in the “Adamic Myth”
Arendt and Kristeva appropriate Christian concepts of forgiveness in sec
ular terms. Kristeva’s forgiven speaking subject is innocent and responsi
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ble, but not a sinner; the love that forgives in the “third” of transference
and counter-transference is strictly a human love; and the forgiveness it
confers enables a creativity that is primarily aesthetic, not moral. In turn,
Arendt conceives of forgiving and promising as strictly human and not
divine activities. Although forgiving and promise enable us to grapple in
creative ways with the irreversible consequences of wrongdoing and the
unpredictability of life, we, as human beings, nonetheless remain power
less in the face of “radical evil.” We are incapable of either punishing or
forgiving it. These points of difference between these secular appropria
tions of Christian forgiveness and a classically Christian understanding
of forgiveness will become salient in the following discussion of
Ricoeur’s detailed analysis of the biblical traditions that inform Paul’s
Christology, which Ricoeur depicts as the “Adamic myth.”30

Defilement, Sin, and Guilt

Kristeva has already introduced us to Ricoeur’s complex threefold con
ception of human evil as a movement from defilement to sin and guilt.31
Defilement links evil not with moral fault but with misfortune, disease,
death, and failure. Like a stain, defilement infects us with something
outside of us that makes us “unclean” (as in Isa. 6:5). Purification of
some sort, which “washes,” “cleanses,” and “purges” us, rids us of what
defiles us (as in Ps. 51:2, 7).
By contrast, sin links evil with violating a covenant “before God.”
Sin, therefore, violates a personal bond. The diverse range of biblical
genres (from narratives to hymns, oracles, sayings, and laments) depict
sin in the same way. They all make clear that sin violates an imperative,
an imperative always set within the context of a word that summons,
calls, or elects a people to a unique relationship with their God.
Objectively, this imperative within a summons takes the form of
an infinite demand that is also a finite or limited imperative. The con
joining of infinite demand with a finite imperative has its most precise
form in the Decalogue of Exodus 20:1-17. The utterances of the proph30. The classical locus for the “Adamic myth” in the New Testament is Romans
5:12-21 (see also 1 Cor. 15:21-26, 45-49).
31. See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism ofEvil. Page numbers given parenthetically in
this section will refer to this text.
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ets also take this form — from Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah to Jeremiah and
Ezekiel to the later reforms of Josiah and the codes of Deuteronomy,
which are what Jesus quotes when he summarizes the law as two great
commandments (Deut. 6:4-6). Beyond any expression in history or fi
nite observance, God’s infinite demand is a form of political nihilism:
it brings all history and politics under judgment; it allows no room for
self-justification, personal or corporate.
Subjectively, this imperative within a summons takes the form of
divine wrath. Human beings cannot see God. Those who do encounter
God in palpable ways experience great terror — for example, Moses at
Horeb (Exod. 3), Isaiah at the temple (Isa. 6), and Ezekiel face to face
with God’s glory (Ezek. 1-3). Divine wrath does not vindicate ancient ta
boos; it is not the resurgence of primary chaos. Rather, the “wrath of
God,” the “day of Yahweh,” is the countenance of God’s holiness for sin
ful human beings, a holiness that is as just and righteous as it is power
ful. This countenance — God’s seeing us — causes us to perceive our lives
and our actions from the standpoint of God’s holiness. Nonetheless, be
cause God’s summons or election of a people always encompasses God’s
infinite demand, an announcement of promise always accompanies the
announcement of imminent threat. The prophets present human
choice with judgment and promise, destruction and salvation: “Seek the
Lord and live” (Amos 5:6); and, “I have set before you life and death,
blessings and curses. Choose life so that you and your descendants may
live” (Deut. 30:19). Divine wrath reminds the people of the “truth” nec
essary for any reconciliation with God and others (Ps. 51:6).
Sin is the violation of the covenant, a quasi-personal bond. Thus,
in a fashion analogous to the way purification rites cleanse us of what
“defiles” us, so the pardon that restores this bond takes the form of a
“return” (shav) to the covenant. The Hebrew root words for sin have to
do with “missing the mark” (chatta’t:), “deviation from the straight road”
(‘awon), and “rebellion,” “revolt,” or “stiff-neckedness” (pesba‘) (p. 72).
These images have to do with relations of orientation in space, not with
infection from a harmful substance. Pardon follows a return to a right
orientation. “Repentance” (tesbubah) leads to restoration, the renewing
of the primitive bond: “in returning and rest you shall be saved” (Isa.
30:15; see also Jeremiah and Hosea). Such “return” is a human choice,
but the prophets also implore God to make the people return and, in
many instances, emphasize God’s side alone, depicting the “return” as
the “effect of a love, of a besed beyond all reasons (Deut 7:5^.)” (p. 80). In
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Jeremiah and Ezekiel, for example, “pardon” and “return” coincide with
receiving a “heart of flesh” instead of a “heart of stone,” and Second Isa
iah articulates a “most acute sense” of the “gratuitousness of grace” in
contrast to the “nothingness of creatures” (e.g., in Isa. 4o:iff.).
The prophets describe sinners’ going away from God as a kind of
“nothingness” — not a nothingness worked out in relation to a concept
of being, but a nothingness linked with failure, deviation, rebellion, or
going astray. The vanity of idols is like the “breath of air” that passes. It
is light, empty, insubstantial, and futile — like dust or an exhalation
(see, e.g., Isa. 41:24). Nonetheless, biblical traditions also depict sin as
having a positive quality. Drawing on archaic images of defilement to
describe the hold sin has on people, they depict sin not only as the vio
lation of a personal and communal covenant, but also as a sickness and
as something brought on by demons or evil spirits. In these instances,
sin is a power that binds sinners, holding them in social and
intersubjective captivity to a fascinating, frenetic, and evil force that
not only hardens their intent to sin but also defiles them, making them
impotent to change their situation.
In the face of this aspect of sin, we are not free to make a radical
choice between good and evil. Rather, we need to be liberated from the
captivity that holds us. Instead, then, of linking pardon only with re
turn, biblical traditions also link pardon to the way slaves are liberated
or “bought back” from slavery by way of a “ransom” given in “ex
change” for their lives (p. 91). Three Hebrew root words each develop an
aspect of this “exchange.” Ga’al furnishes a chain of images, from
avenging and protecting to covering or hiding, buying back, and deliv
ering (p. 91). Padah alludes to the custom of “buying back the offering
of the first born or slaves by ransom” (p. 91). And kapar, drawing on im
ages of covering and effacing, connotes a ransom that releases one
from a severe penalty or that saves one’s life, images that also furnish
the basic image of “expiation” (p. 92). Exodus, the liberation of the Isra
elites from slavery in Egypt, furnishes the primary event in Israel’s his
tory of “buying back” (Exod. 14; Deut. 26:5-10). Later traditions relate
this image of liberation from slavery to images of God’s theogonic vic
tory over the waters of chaos (Ps. 106:9; HdG)-32 Second Isaiah makes
32. In Psalm 106:9, God, in mighty power, “rebuked the Red Sea,” an allusion that
links the liberation from slavery in Egypt with depictions of the victory of God over the
primeval waters of chaos.
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the most explicit connection between God’s creative power and the “ex
change” God makes to “ransom” God’s people in a new exodus out of
Babylonian captivity (Isa. 43, 44), an “exchange” that is tied as well to
the “return” of “the ransomed of the Lord” (Isa. 51:9-10).
Not only does God liberate us from the power of sin, but God also
cleanses us from its defiling effects — the “punishment” we “bear” for it
(Ezek. 14:10), its “subjective weight” and “objective maleficence” we ex
perience in our bodies (p. 95). The priestly cycle of texts tends to link
sin with “dread” and the “threat of death” — a “blow” or a “wound”
(e.g., Lev. 10:6; Num. 1:53; 17:12; 18:3). Various rites of sacrifice in Leviti
cus deal with these “realistic” and “dangerous” aspects of sin (p. 95). As
an “expiation” (kipper) for sin, sacrifice enacts the pardon that “buys
back” and “ransoms” one from sin (Lev. 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13). Not a
magical rite, biblical sacrificial expiation focuses on how, “as life, it is
the blood that makes atonement” (Lev. 17:11, my emphasis) or “ransoms”
(cf. Exod. 30:12, 15,16).
Blood is what relates the “rite of expiation” to “faith in the par
don” that confession of sins and repentance presuppose (p. 97). As a gift
“given” by God, blood is what restores the one confessing and repent
ing to a right relationship with God, a theme echoed in psalms that in
voke God as the subject of expiation (78:38; 65:3; 79:9). Indeed, the very
ritual of the “day of expiation” (Lev. 16) relates the “confession of sins”
not only to “expiation,” with its “multiple sprinklings,” but also to the
“rite of the goat driven into the desert to carry away the sins of Israel”
(p. 98). In sum, the “ceremonial expiation” of priestly texts cannot be
divorced from the prophetic linkage of pardon with themes of return
and ransom.
Finally, as an awareness of sin and its defilement, guilt expresses
the paradox in a Christian understanding of human fault: we are re
sponsible for and yet captive to the sin that binds us. In spite of being
created in God’s image and therefore free, we find, as Luther would ob
serve, that our will remains servile and bound. In Paul’s words, “I do not
do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do” (Rom. 7:19).
Long before the trajectory of philosophers who would reflect on exis
tential alienation (from Hegel to Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Freud),
Paul understood how the law, when severed from the dialogical relation
of the covenant, sets before us an accusation that, when atomized into
an indefinite number of demands (what Hegel would call the “evil infi
nite”), alienates from ourselves. The “curse of the law,” according to
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Paul, comes upon “everyone who does not observe and obey all the
things written in the book of the law” (Gal. 3:10-14). The law even leads
us to sin, not because it is evil — the law in itself is good — but because
we are impotent in the face of its demands. “Justification” is Paul’s re
sponse to this dilemma, and it comes only from the “righteousness of
God” disclosed “apart from the law” (Rom. 3:21) (pp. 139-50).

The Adamic Myth

“Justification” and the “righteousness of God” that enacts it must be
set within the eschatological context of Paul’s theology. The forensic
declaration that one stands justified and righteous before God has to
do with a future that has relevance for the present — an outward reality
that has import for one’s internal struggle with sin. Thus, Ricoeur re
lates justification to the broader context of what he calls the “Adamic
myth” (Rom. 5:12-21; cf. 1 Cor. 15:21-26). Adam’s “trespass,” his grasping
for what was God’s alone (Gen. 3:3), brought death which “spread” and
became an unavoidable condition for all (Rom. 5:12-13). By contrast, Je
sus Christ, the “Second Adam,” who “emptied” himself in spite of shar
ing equality with God (Phil. 2:7), enacts a “free gift” that leads to “justi
fication and life for all” (Rom. 5:15-17).
Of course, Adam is not a central figure in the Old Testament. The
narratives in Genesis place more emphasis on Noah and Abraham, and
the prophets completely ignore him. Even Jesus does not refer to Adam
— the Synoptic Gospels link evil to an evil heart or the work of an Ad
versary. Nonetheless, the twofoldjewish confession of sin — that God is
good and human beings are responsible and not innocent — prepares
the way for the Christian Adamic myth. Near Eastern theogonic myths
depict the creation of the world as the liberating act of gods who strug
gle with chaos; evil as chaos is part of the origin of things and salvation
or liberation from chaos occurs with the same act that creates the
world. By contrast, in the Adamic myth, which draws on the Genesis
stories of creation, God is good and creation is good; evil is not part of
the origin of things. Wickedness emerges in human history — with hu
man sin — and not in a theogonic struggle with chaos. Salvation, then,
in its view presupposes a future eschatology that is distinct from the
end of creation; it preserves a tension between a creation that exists
now and a salvation that is yet to come (pp. 161-74).
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The second Adam, Christ, enacts this future eschatology. He is
the “perfect human being,” the figure who will redeem “sinful human
beings” who are responsible for their sin yet held captive by it. How
does he emerge as an eschatological figure? For Paul, Abraham’s call is
an initial answer to the first Adam. He believes in God, who “reckoned”
this belief “as righteousness” (Rom. 4:3; cf. Gen. 15:6). Even before the
emergence of eschatology in biblical history, Abraham is involved in a
covenant that integrates the disparate stories of his descendants —
from Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph on to the trajectory of Israel’s history —
into a larger story of promise and fulfillment. Noah’s covenant with
God is yet another answer to the first Adam, although it brings to the
fore what is universal in the covenant with Abraham — that all people
are under the promise given to Noah. Later Christian baptismal imag
ery, with its enactment of burial and resurrection, will draw on the im
agery of Noah’s flood to signify not only God’s wrath but also God’s
power to bring about a new creation (pp. 238ff.).
Postponed in the epochs of Israel’s history — from Exodus, Sinai,
and the wandering in the desert to the conquest and establishment of
Zion with its Davidic monarchy — the promise to Abraham takes on a
new form when Israel ceases to exist as an independent nation. The fig
ure of a king, in an idealization of the Davidic monarchy, becomes
“eschatologized” into a messianic figure (pp. 264LL). The kingdom
“founded in those times” transforms into “the kingdom to come”
(p. 264). The earthly and political hopes identified with the Davidic
monarchy become the expectation of a new age identified with the Son
of David. Biblical traditions sanction the royalty of this future messiah
with God’s creative power to bring about a new creation, appropriating
strands of Near Eastern creation combat myths, which sanctioned the
royalty of ancient kings by linking the king’s power with the creative
and liberating act of the gods that banished chaos at the origins of
time.33
In addition to this eschatologized messianic figure, two other
biblical figures become prominent in later New Testament exegesis (pp.
265ff.). The first is the “Servant of Yahweh” of the “Suffering Servant
33. In their depictions of God’s unique creative and redemptive power, biblical
traditions echo ancient Near Eastern theogonic myths that sanctioned kingly power
with their depictions of the defeat of the powers of chaos represented by floods and wa
ters (see, e.g., Ps. 74:12-17; 93:3-4; 104:7-9; Job 38:8-11; Isa. 27:1; 51:9-10).
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Songs,”34 who will restore Israel’s survivors. Although enigmatic (the
“Suffering Servant” could refer to an individual or a nation), this fig
ure exchanges his suffering for the sins of others: he “was wounded for
our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the pun
ishment that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed” (Isa.
53:5). Neither merely the transfer of defilement onto a scapegoat nor
simply the destiny of a misunderstood prophet, what occurs through
the suffering of this figure is a voluntary gift, an expiation that enacts
their pardon. The second historical figure is the “Son of Man” identi
fied with the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7. Also enigmatic (this figure
could refer to an individual or a personified collective), the Son of Man
is not the “first man” but the “Man of the end.” Although a “replica of
the first Man,” created in God’s image, he is nonetheless “new in rela
tion to him” (p. 268). As judge and king, he will come at the Last Judg
ment “with the clouds of heaven” to establish “an everlasting domin
ion” over “all peoples, nations, and languages” (Dan. 7:13-14).
The Gospels bring these figures together in two affirmations.
Not only does Jesus refer to himself as the Son of Man (Mark 13:26-27),
but he also unites the idea of the “Son of Man” with the idea of “suffer
ing and death,” which had been a central theme for the Servant of
Yahweh (pp. 269ff.). By bringing these two figures together, Jesus rede
fines a “theology of glory” by way of a “theology of the cross,” linking
the roles of “king” and “judge” to that of “pardoner” and “healer” (pp.
269ff.). Paul’s Christology also appears to relate the themes identified
with these two figures. Even the hymn in Philippians 2:5-11 appears to
identify characteristics of the Son of Man (“he was in the form of
God”) with characteristics of the Servant of Yahweh (he “emptied him
self ... to the point of death”).
Moreover, although Paul’s Christology draws a parallel between
the first and the second Adam (the fault of one brings judgment on all;
the justice of one brings justice for all), he also makes clear that this
parallel is not parallel at all. The “free gift” is very different from the
“trespass” (Rom. 5:15). It enacts a “much more” that not only restores
what existed before the first trespass but also “much more surely”
brings about an “abundance of grace” (v. 17).
In sum, Paul’s understanding of justification cannot be divorced
34. Scholars have identified the following texts as “servant songs”: Isaiah 49:1-9;
50:4-11; 52:13-53:12.
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from eschatological imagery. Justification by faith, with its “experience
of pardon,” is “so to speak, the psychological trace” of what happens in
reality — the incorporation of believers into the “new Adam” as they are
“transformed [peTapop<poOo0ai — metamorphosed] into the same im
age [eiKdov]” (2 Cor. 3:18) and “conformed [ouppopcpoq] to the image
[eIkujv]” of the Son (Rom. 8:29). Having “borne the image of the man of
dust,” we will also “bear the image of the man of heaven” (1 Cor. 15:49)
(p. 275). Justification deals not only with juridical imputation, which
echoes aspects of the contractual character of the covenant, but also
with a messianic expiation that links the remission of sins with images
of unbinding and purifying. Further, the image of cosmic judgment
over all only amplifies these themes: the “one” is for “all” (Gal. 3:20). Al
though deeply personal, this eschatological judgment is also commu
nal. It incorporates the prophets’ call to “return” into a picture of es
chatological judgment and acquittal. Baptized into Christ’s death and
resurrection, believers now belong to Christ’s “body” (1 Cor. 12); they
now share the “mind” of Christ (1 Cor. 2:16; Phil. 2:5). Finally, justifica
tion involves the redemption of bodies and the entire cosmos — the res
urrection of the “body” (1 Cor. 15:35-58) and a “new creation” (Gal. 6:15).
However, as Ricoeur points out, the Adamic myth needs to be
complemented by two recessive myths in biblical theology — the theogonic and the tragic — if it is to do justice to life’s complexity. We have
already alluded to the way the eschatologizing of the Davidic reign into
hopes for a future messiah incorporates theogonic themes from Near
Eastern creation myths. Nonetheless, the tragic also exists as a recessive
theme in biblical theology. In Greek tragedies, tragic heroes suffer in
nocently and therefore question whether a simple theory of retribution
— that supposes that if you do evil, you will die — can account for inno
cent suffering. Job, the Bible’s epitome of a tragic figure, receives no an
swer for why he, a just man, has suffered so much. All he receives in re
sponse to his queries are the sea monsters, Behemoth and Leviathan,
who as figures associated with a primordial chaos are tamed, and the
experience of “seeing” the God whom he had only previously “heard of
. . . by the hearing of the ear” (Job 42:5). Job’s innocent suffering ques
tions any facile theory of retribution. As Ricoeur points out, Job and
Adam stand in sharp contrast. Adam’s sin leads to just banishment.
Job’s innocence leads to unjust suffering. As a third figure, the Servant
of Yahweh causes us to rethink both the theory of retribution identi
fied with Adam and the conception of tragedy identified with Job. The
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Suffering Servant’s voluntary suffering — a senseless, scandalous suf
fering — is the expiation whereby both sin and suffering are replaced
with pardon and healing.
In addition, as Job’s own encounter with the sea monsters sug
gests, the tragic also hints at theogonic themes, which persist even to
day long after the naive theogonies of the biblical Near East have died.
Philosophers and worldviews continue to identify evil and tragedy with
existence itself or, in philosophical terms, with a negativity that coin
cides with the very logic of being. By including in God’s life the figure
of the Servant of Yahweh, Christology incorporates suffering as a mo
ment in divinity. This moment of abasement and annihilation in God’s
life completes and suppresses tragedy because God takes on the evil of
the world. Christ becomes the “curse for us” (Gal. 3:13); the Son of Man
is the one delivered up and subjected to futility. Yet, in this moment,
the fate of tragedy is suppressed by being inverted. In theogonic myths,
the child often murders the parents in order to overcome chaos. In the
Adamic myth, Christ offers himself to God for others; as victim, he is
thereby glorified. Fate is inverted by voluntary gift.

Christ and the Moral Life Revisited
How do we relate this Christology to ethics? Further, how might its
similarities and differences with Kristeva’s and Arendt’s secular appro
priations of Christian forgiveness shed light on who we are and how we
should live?35

Creation, Sin, and Redemption

This Christology presupposes a particular understanding of God and
the world. On the one hand, it presupposes not only that God is good,
but that creation is good as well. Evil is not part of the origin of things.
Moreover, it presupposes that, as those created in God’s image, we can
perceive and respond to the world God has created with discernment
35. See also Shults and Sandage, Faces ofForgiveness, which also seeks to integrate
psychological and theological accounts around the virtues of “faith,” “hope,” and
“love.”
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and judgment. Not only can we use language to generate insight into
this created world — we can imagine and create new possibilities (artis
tic, technical, theoretical, and practical) — but we can also deliberate
and decide how best to respond to it. We can encounter this world “re
sponsibly,” that is, not through “compulsion” but with “deliberation”
and “decision.”36
On the other hand, when we interpret and respond to what hap
pens around us, we do so out of the concrete totality of all that consti
tutes who we are. This includes who we are as those shaped by nature,
history, and even by ourselves (our past perceptions and responses to
life). It includes the structure of our bodies, our psychic strivings, our
spiritual character, the communities to which we belong, our past re
membered and forgotten — in general the environment and world that
have shaped and had an impact on us.37 Hence, our freedom always has
a given character. It always responds to what exists already.
This makes it difficult for us to ascertain precisely where personal
responsibility for our lives actually begins. Kristeva’s psychoanalytic in
sights into the “ill-being” we carry in our bodies speak profoundly of
how the complex of defilement, sin, and guilt affects us. Defiled not
only by what we have done but also by what others have done to us, we
find ourselves enmeshed in a residue of personal and corporate guilt
that contaminates us in deep, often unconscious ways. As her work as a
psychoanalyst attests, our bodily and psychic instincts often drive our
motives and actions at a level much deeper than our conscious aware
ness. This is why ancient notions of defilement are still relevant to our
contemporary notions of sin and guilt. Moreover, as Paul and the Old
Testament prophets asserted, our interests, whether they are social, cul
tural, political, or economic, affect what we think and do often at a
level much deeper than our stated intentions. Even the natural world
that surrounds us is infected to some extent by human defilement, a
theme that echoes the “curse” found on the earth (of Gen. 3:17-19) or
the “bondage to futility” about which Paul speaks (in Rom. 8:20). As
the biblical imagery we have surveyed suggests, sin involves not only
straying and wandering from our relationship to God and others but
36. See Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox
Press, 1963). See also his Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1963), PP- l82ff.
37. Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, pp. i85ff.
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being held in captivity as well. In line with prophetic and apocalyptic
judgments, structures of evil govern this estranged world; demonic
powers rule not only individuals, but also nations and nature.38
Christians believe that Jesus, as the crucified Messiah, liberates
not only all people, but also all of nature, from these powers. Christ’s
crucified and raised body is the place in God’s life where God’s forgive
ness is given — is transferred — to us. This body takes on the “curse” of
sin that separates us from the one Jesus called Father. In a fashion simi
lar to the way forgiveness is enacted in the transference that takes place
between the analyst and the analysand, our forgiveness is enacted in
the transference — the “exchange” — whereby Christ takes on our sin
and gives us his life in its stead.39 All of this, in trinitarian theology,
takes place through the power of the Spirit who unites the will of the
Son with the Father even when Jesus cries out “My God, my God, why
have you forsaken me?” (Mark 15:34). The Spirit creates the “space” not
only for this greatest difference and yet unity within trinitarian life, but
also for our participation in Christ’s crucified and raised body through
baptism (Rom. 6:1-14). In this participation, we die to our sinful self
and are raised by the same Spirit who raised Jesus from the dead. We
now are a “new creation” in Christ. We find ourselves in the “space” of
God’s reign of justice and mercy, a “space” created and permeated by
the Spirit, which makes our forgiveness of one another — as both vic
tims and perpetrators — possible.

Ethical Implications

What, then, does this mean for ethics? We return to Gustafson’s three
questions about Christ and the moral life. What does this mean for our
understanding of the nature and locus of moral goodness? In this Christol
ogy, the nature and locus of moral goodness lies in Christ’s crucified
and raised body. By way of our participation in this “third,” Christ’s
body and the new creation or reign of God it enacts among us, we are
not only reconciled to God but also reconciled to one another, as both
38. Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p. 27.
39. On this “exchange,” see Galatians 3:13 and 2 Corinthians 5:17. See also Hans
Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 4: Action, trans. Graham
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994).
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victims and perpetrators. In the space of this “third,” the tangible locus
in which we participate bodily through baptism, the Lord’s Supper,
and our daily dying and rising in Christ within the complexity of our
everyday lives, we are freed from what holds us back from relating to
one another as truly responsible and free subjects. Christ’s body sus
tains the ongoing “natality” of which Arendt speaks. It sustains our
“mutual release,” our capacity to forgive and be forgiven in an unpre
dictable world with the promise of God’s unconditional love (Rom.
8:38-39). Within it, what appears irreversible — the seemingly endless
patterns of vengeance and punishment that capture us in cycles of
cause and effect — is reversed.
Christ’s crucified and raised body, which, in the Spirit’s power, is
the basis for our being able to have true community with one another,
provides an even more substantial transfer of love than one finds in a
psychoanalyst’s office. It is the location, which we can see and tangibly
ingest in bread and wine, where, in Kristeva’s words, our “ill-being,” the
defilement and guilt of our sin, both personal and corporate, is re
leased and re-created into new life. We now can respond creatively to
the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Christ’s body sustains
our capacity to make conscious the fears and desires we dare not face —
the fears and desires that propel us into sin — so that we can truly
think, speak, and act as free ethical agents who are capable of valuing
others as much as we value ourselves (Rom. 13:8-10).
Even though it justifies both victims and perpetrators, it also, as
the Gospels make evident, clearly distinguishes between them, often by
unveiling our distortions regarding who is truly righteous and who is
truly sinful, who is inside the law and who is outside of it. Christ’s
death and resurrection clearly demarcate the distinction between the
“old age” and the “new age,” the first Adam and the second Adam, the
“flesh” and the “Spirit.” This contrast is not based on the law. Here
“circumcision” and “uncircumcision” no longer count, only “faith
working out in love” (Gal. 5:6). Even though this God’s creative righ
teousness is enacted “apart from the law” (Rom. 3:21), it nonetheless en
ables us to fulfill the just requirement of the law (Rom. 8:4). Freed from
the law, sin, and death, we now can use that freedom in service of oth
ers rather than simply for our own interests. Incorporated into Christ’s
body, we are given a very different “mind” for perceiving and respond
ing to the world. Incorporated into a very different kind of power and
wisdom, God’s infinite power and infinite wisdom, we now are able to
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perceive and respond to one another from the standpoint of its infinite
excess and not from the standpoint of our finite fears and desires.
We no longer need to see one another — or the leaders, slogans,
and groups with which we align ourselves — as competitors for finite
goods (i Cor. 1-3). “All is yours,” Paul avers, “past, present, and future,
life and death” (3:23). The implications of this are great. Our participa
tion in Christ’s justification is a participation in God’s creative righ
teousness. This divine righteousness endows us with a “moral creativ
ity”40 that also gives us the power to forgive — to release and heal (at
least to some extent on this side of the eschaton) — the evil residue in
our own bodies as individuals, as families, as communities, and even as
participants in the natural world.
Second, what does this mean for the character of the moral self our
capacity for ethical agency? In this Christology, participation in
Christ’s crucified and raised body is what constitutes the moral self.
Kristeva’s depiction of how the love transferred between the psychoan
alyst and analyst “forgives” the ill-being that hinders speaking subjects
and releases their creative capacities provides a helpful analogue for
what happens when sinners are justified by Christ’s death and resur
rection and thereby set onto new and more creative ways of being in the
Spirit. Participation in Christ’s body frees us to become responsible
agents capable of deliberating how best to exercise our individual ca
pacities in the service of the “common good” (1 Cor. 12:7). William
Schweiker describes Christian responsibility as a “radical interpreta
tion” of our circumstances in order to discern how best to use the
power we have at our disposal in the service of the good; such radical
interpretation discerns how best to integrate the finite goods we have
at our disposal in the service of “respecting and enhancing finite life.”41
Participation in Christ’s crucified and raised body carries us into an
even deeper discernment of where God’s creative righteousness is un
leashing moral creativity within and among us, enabling us to forgive
and heal the evil residue in our psyche and patterns of interaction.
Thus, Paul’s ethical creativity differs from Kristeva’s aesthetic cre
ativity. For Kristeva, we are responsible and innocent. For Paul we are
40. See John Wall, Monti Creativity: Paul Ricoeur and the Poetics of Possibility (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
41. William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
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responsible and guilty; what is forgiven is not merely psychological illbeing but radical evil — the fact that “in my flesh, I can will what is
right, but I cannot do it” (Rom. 7:18). For Paul, we are not merely vic
tims of the powers that keep us from doing what we know is right, but
perpetrators whose very acquiescence to these powers hardens not only
our captivity but others’ captivity as well. For Paul, faith is never merely
about individual salvation. It is about being incorporated into a body
that consists of others as well. Justification may be “transmoral” in
that it surpasses the law, but it does not do away with the law, in partic
ular, its twofold summary in the commands to love God and one’s
neighbor as one’s self; rather, it gives us the power to fulfill the law. Jus
tification enacts a righteous self-identity that is always also an identity
with others. It enables one not only to individuate as fully as one can
and ought as a finite creature capable of free thought and action, but
also to participate as fully as one can and ought in the lives of other fi
nite agents, who are also capable of fully individuating and participat
ing in relation with others. God’s love is always universal in its scope,
working “all things for good” not only for individuals but also for all
people and even the cosmos (Rom. 8:28).
Third, what does this mean for the criteria, norms, and values that
we turn to for guiding our judgments and actions? The criterion that
guides our judgments and actions is, again, Christ’s crucified and
raised body, a body that opens up a new space — a new construal of the
“in-between” among us — that allows for the continual creative undo
ing of dysfunctional patterns and unleashing of new life. This body
sustains the most radical interpretation we can make of our lives: it en
ables us to discern how Christ’s Spirit is resurrecting new life out of the
defilement and guilt of our sin. As we appropriate and integrate the
goods we have at our disposal, we are impelled to go even deeper in dis
cerning how we can participate in the concrete ways God’s forgiving
and healing power actually transforms ill-being in our midst. As we
daily die and rise in Christ, as we daily put to death the “sin” in our
“bodies” so that “we too might walk in newness of life” (Rom. 6:1-12),
our bodies become the location where, as Paul states, “death is at work
in us” in order to bring about “life in you” (2 Cor. 4:12).
Relevant here is Arendt’s understanding of how forgiving and
promising give us the “miracle” of natality. Still, Christ’s crucified and
raised body undergirds the forgiving and promising Arendt speaks of
with an eschatological hope in God’s ultimate power to redeem all of
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life. Its creativity has the power to redeem what often appears to be our
tragic vulnerability not only in the face of life’s sheer capriciousness,
but also in the face of radical evil itself. The New Testament interpreted
Christ’s suffering in terms of the suffering of the Servant of Yahweh
and not in terms of the suffering of Job. Christ’s suffering and death
entails the “natality” of new creation. The wisdom and power of the
cross is not merely “foolish” but also paradoxically “wise,” not merely
“weak” but also paradoxically “strong” (i Cor. 1:18-25).
Thus, Paul commends us to value hardships as much as we do the
honors and pleasures of life: “We are afflicted in every way, but not
crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; persecuted, but not for
saken; struck down, but not destroyed” (2 Cor. 4:8-9). Indeed, we are
those who are “always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that
the life ofJesus may also be made visible in our bodies” (v. 10). Thus, we
must put to death any messianic pretensions to impose our will on oth
ers, and in so doing negate their freedom to act and think as those who
are also created in God’s image. Justification and the creative righ
teousness it enacts also judge — put to death — any creative use of
power that fails to recognize its own potential for radical evil. Christ’s
messianic reign brings together both the Son of Man’s judgment and
power and the Servant of Yahweh’s suffering and pardon.
Later work will need to spell out in much more detail the ethical
implications of this Christology for ecclesial and political life. In this
reading of Paul’s theology of justification alongside two contemporary
accounts of forgiveness, my intent has simply been to argue that (in
Paul’s theology at least) the pivot relating Christ and ethics centers on
our participation in Christ’s death and resurrection, a pivot that al
ways links our justification to the new creation Christ’s Spirit is enact
ing in our midst. Early Christians like Paul interpreted not only the
scandal of Christ’s death, the scandal of a crucified Messiah who died a
political and religious failure, but also their own sin and sufferings in
terms that fused messianic images of a future Davidic reign with im
ages of the Son of Man and the Servant of Yahweh. By faith they con
fessed that, far from being tragic, Christ’s suffering and death ushered
in a new age in which the sufferings we now experience are the birth
pangs of a new reign of God being enacted in our midst. By faith we too
can radically interpret, that is, perceive and respond to, the seeming
“futility” of our circumstances in this created world the way a mother
experiences the pangs of giving birth to a child (Rom. 8:12-24).
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As our source of the good, capacity for agency, and criterion for
judgment, Christ’s crucified and raised body not only forgives and
cleanses us of all defilement, sin, and guilt, but also incorporates us
into a new crucified and raised body. This gives us hope. Not a hope in
utopian illusions, this hope is realistic — something we actually experi
ence in our bodies — enabling us to affirm confidently that we can en
act new ways of being, in spite of and in the midst of the ill-being we
find within and around us. We can not only promise to respect and
care for others and ourselves, but we can also forgive and be forgiven by
one another when we fail, confident that whether or not we achieve
success in human terms, “all things” do indeed “work for good” ac
cording to God’s “purpose” for them (Rom. 8:28).
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